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Close cousins in protection:
the evolution of two norms

The Protection of Civilians (PoC) in peacekeeping and the Responsibility to
Protect (R2P) populations from atrocity crimes are two norms that emerged at
the turn of the new millennium with the aim of protecting vulnerable peoples
from mass violence and/or systematic and widespread violations of human rights.
While R2P addresses a specific set of extreme situations in which any of four
crimes (genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity) have been
committed, PoC tackles a broader set of threats and is concerned with violence
directed at civilians in conflict and post-conflict settings. To date, most scholars
have analysed the evolution of discourse over the status, strength and robustness of the two norms separately.1 Moreover, actors both within and outside the
UN system have frequently insisted on their separation. And yet the distinction
between the two norms has at times been exceptionally fine. The Security Council
has made reference to R2P in the context of particular peacekeeping operations
and, in the case of Libya in 2011, authorized enforcement action to protect civilians
without explicit reference to R2P.
In this article we draw on the framework established by Stimmer and Wisken to
analyse the joint evolution of PoC and R2P within the UN system and the related
question of the discrepancy between their degree of institutionalization and actual
state practice. The framework is valuable in that it distinguishes between discursive and behavioural forms of contestation;2 identifies implementation access as a
*
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This article was funded by the European Union’s Programme FP/2007-2013, Grant Agreement no. 340956–
IOW. The authors wish to thank the editors of this special section, Anette Stimmer and Lea Wisken, for their
insightful comments, as well as the three anonymous reviewers for their constructive suggestions.
On R2P, see Ramesh Thakur, ‘The Responsibility to Protect at 15’, International Affairs 92: 2, March 2016, pp.
415–34; Philipp Rotmann, Gerrit Kurtz and Sarah Brockmeier, ‘Major powers and the contested evolution
of a Responsibility to Protect’, Conflict, Security and Development 14: 4, 2014, pp. 355–77; Jennifer M. Welsh,
‘Norm contestation and the Responsibility to Protect’, Global Responsibility to Protect 5: 4, 2013, pp. 365–96; and
Jennifer M. Welsh, ‘Norm robustness and the Responsibility to Protect’, Journal of Global Security Studies 4: 1,
2019, pp. 53–72. On PoC in peacekeeping, see Alex J. Bellamy and Charles T. Hunt, ‘Twenty-first century
UN peace operations’, International Affairs 91: 6, Nov. 2015, pp. 1290–94; Emily Paddon Rhoads, Taking sides
in peacekeeping: impartiality and the future of the United Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). Several
scholars examine the similarities and contrasts between R2P and PoC, including how these norms are viewed
by different audiences. They do not, however, explicitly analyse their joint evolution. See Angus Francis,
Vesselin Popovski and Charles Sampford, eds, Norms of protection: Responsibility to Protect, Protection of Civilians
and their interaction (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2012); Hugh Breakey, ‘Protection norms and
human rights’, Global Responsibility to Protect 4: 3, 2012, pp. 309–33.
Stimmer and Wisken define discursive contestation as ‘debates about different understandings of the meaning
and/or (relative) importance of a norm’, while behavioural contestation occurs ‘when the actions of relevant
actors imply the existence of conflicting understandings of the meaning and/or (relative) importance of a
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norm’. See Anette Stimmer and Lea Wisken, ‘The dynamics of dissent: when actions are louder than words’,
International Affairs 95: 3, May 2019, doi: 10.1093/ia/iiz019.
Stimmer and Wisken define implementation access as the ‘positional, material and social assets required for
putting a norm into practice’. These resources ‘endow actors with greater leverage for affecting norm implementation and hence also greater abilities and incentives to use behavioural contestation’: ‘The dynamics of
dissent’.
Notable exceptions include Welsh, ‘Norm contestation’; Paddon Rhoads, Taking sides in peacekeeping; and Carla
Winston, ‘Norm structure, diffusion, and evolution: a conceptual approach’, European Journal of International
Relations 24: 3, 2018, pp. 638–61.
See e.g. Amitav Acharya, ‘How ideas spread: whose norms matter? Norm localization and institutional change
in Asian regionalism’, International Organization 58: 2, 2004, pp. 239–75.
Katharina Coleman, ‘Locating norm diplomacy: venue change in international norm negotiations’, European
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prerequisite for behavioural contestation;3 and posits norm ambiguity and degree
of norm acceptance as triggers that increase the likelihood of dissent.
Our central arguments regarding the joint evolution of PoC and R2P are
twofold. First, while there is strong evidence of institutionalization and implementation of particular aspects of both norms, discursive and behavioural contestation
of pillar three of R2P—which concerns the responsibility of the international
community to take appropriate collective action where a state is manifestly failing
to protect its own population—and of the use of force for protection in peacekeeping have increased significantly over time and are closely linked. Second, the
evolution of R2P and PoC has broadly unfolded in a diamond-shaped fashion:
having emerged from a similar individualist normative starting-point, they then
diverged in their early development as their proponents interacted with relevant
audiences and identified the practical implications of their respective normative
imperatives; more recently, they have begun to reconverge in their return to a statecentric focus on building and strengthening the capacity of national authorities to
protect populations. This prioritization of the state is a result partly of efforts by
norm advocates to shore up support for PoC and R2P, but also—particularly in
the case of R2P—of the ability of key states, through discursive contestation, to
shape the meaning of these norms in ways that speak to their normative priorities.
Our analysis contributes to the broader theoretical literature on norms and norm
contestation in a number of ways. First, we move beyond earlier constructivist
studies that examine a single norm and thus underplay the existence of broader
‘norm complexes’ that encompass related principles with shared ethical or political
foundations.4 Where scholars have focused on more than one norm, the relationship between ideational units has been framed in one of two ways: either as a relationship of competition, in which one norm, often an emerging norm, vies with
another existing norm; or as an adaptive process of norm localization, in which
international norms are reinterpreted and reconstituted through their interaction
or ‘fit’ with pre-existing local normative orders.5 By contrast, we demonstrate
that PoC and R2P have evolved and continue to evolve together, underscoring
the importance of ideational interplay and the way in which actors may seek to
strengthen support for one norm, or dimension of a norm, by contrasting it or
linking it with another. Second, our discussion of PoC and R2P draws attention to
the importance of ‘venues’ for norm dynamics and how choice of venue and institutional processes is used strategically to frame normative discourse.6 Finally, with
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Similar but different norms
The emergence of R2P and PoC at the turn of the new millennium was a direct
response to the failures to protect civilians in the ‘safe areas’ of the former
Yugoslavia and from genocide in Rwanda, and the perceived need to clarify the
broader protection obligations of UN forces and member states.7 It was thus
propelled by the normative impulse to prioritize the security not just of sovereign states but of individuals, both in countries’ foreign policies and in the work
of international organizations. A central figure in the promotion of this process
of ‘individualization’ was the new UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who was
significantly affected by previous experience in the Department of Peacekeeping
Operations (DPKO) during the painful episodes of the 1990s.8
Explicit authorization to protect civilians under Chapter VII of the UN Charter was first mandated by the Security Council in 1999, when Resolution 1270
authorized the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) ‘to afford protection to
civilians under imminent threat of physical violence’.9 The genesis of UNAMSIL’s
7
8

9
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respect to the norm contestation framework proposed by Stimmer and Wisken,
we argue that application or invocation of one norm instead of another may itself
figure as behavioural contestation. By extending their framework, we also identify
the absence of clearly assigned responsibility for acting on the prescriptions of
the two norms, and the ambiguity over the nature of obligation inherent in both
of them, as factors that perpetuate both discursive and behavioural contestation,
including the choice to invoke one norm rather than the other.
The article proceeds in three sections. First, we briefly compare and contrast
PoC and R2P according to their origins, scope and structure. We identify three
features common to both norms that render them particularly susceptible to
contestation. The second section traces the evolution of the two norms and their
dynamic interplay across three phases that roughly correspond to norm emergence
and institutionalization (1999–2005), conceptual refinement and early implementation (2006–10) and the ‘mature’ implementation (2011–18) that followed particularly contentious cases, such as those of Côte d’Ivoire and Libya. For each phase,
we identify forms of discursive and behavioural contestation, at the macro level
in policy and mandate creation at UN headquarters, and at the micro level in
specific operational contexts. The final interpretative section engages more closely
with the insights developed in Stimmer and Wisken’s framework regarding the
nature and impact of behavioural contestation, and the ways in which the inherent
features of R2P and PoC create opportunities for states to dissent.

Journal of International Relations 19: 1, 2013, pp. 163–86.
NATO’s intervention in Kosovo also influenced advocates of R2P. See Kofi Annan and Nader Mousavizadeh,
Interventions: a life in war and peace (New York: Penguin, 2012).
Annan and Mousavizadeh, Interventions. See also Gabriella Blum, ‘The individualization of war’, in Austin
Sarat, Lawrence Douglas and Martha Umphrey, eds, Law and war (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
2014); Jennifer Welsh, ‘Humanitarian actors and international political theory’, in Chris Brown and Robyn
Eckersley, eds, The Oxford handbook of international political theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
S/RES/1270, 22 Oct. 1999.
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The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa, Report of the SecretaryGeneral, S/1998/318 (New York: UN, 13 April 1998).
Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/1999/6 (New York: UN, 12 Feb. 1999); Report of the
Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, S/1999/957 (New York:
UN, 8 Sept. 1999).
Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, S/2001/331 (New
York: UN, 30 March 2001), para. 6.
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001).
See A more secure world: our shared responsibility, Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change, A/59/565 (New York: UN, 1 Dec. 2004); In larger freedom: towards development, security
and human rights for all, Report of the Secretary-General, A/59/2005 (New York: UN, 21 March 2005).
See Alex J. Bellamy, Global politics and the Responsibility to Protect: from words to deeds (London: Routledge, 2011).
World summit outcome document, A/Res/60/1 (New York: UN 16 Sept. 2005), paras 138, 139.
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landmark mandate, and the broader thematic work of the Security Council on
PoC, can be traced back to Annan’s 1998 report to the Council on conflict in Africa,
which identified PoC in conflict as a ‘humanitarian imperative’ and called upon the
Council to address both the deep causes and immediate implications of intrastate
wars.10 In February 1999 the Security Council, under the Canadian presidency,
hosted its first open debate dedicated to PoC, followed by the release of a Council
presidential statement and the Secretary-General’s first report on ‘the protection of
civilians in armed conflict’.11 These foundational documents articulated a broad and
multidimensional PoC agenda that the Security Council continues to pursue today.
As Annan’s 2001 report on PoC indicates, protection of civilians was conceived
of as a ‘multi-layered process involving a diversity of entities and approaches’
and encompassing a range of activities from ‘the delivery of humanitarian assistance; the monitoring and recording of violations of international humanitarian
and human rights law ... [to] institution building, governance, and development
programmes; and, ultimately, the deployment of peacekeepers’.12
While PoC’s birth and early development took place within the UN, R2P was
initially conceived and advocated ‘from without’—though with Annan’s strong
encouragement. The independent International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty (ICISS), created by the Canadian government, provided the
intellectual underpinnings for the Responsibility to Protect, through its efforts
to reshape the meaning of sovereignty and to identify a spectrum of actions to
address the challenge of atrocity crimes, that ranged from prevention to response
to post-conflict rebuilding.13 The concept of R2P subsequently entered the UN
system as part of the preparatory documents for the 2005 world summit.14 After
intense negotiations during which opposition to R2P was voiced from various
quarters,15 member states included the principle in article 138 of the summit
outcome document, which affirmed the primary responsibility of states to protect
their own populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes
against humanity. Article 139 outlined a collective responsibility on the part
of states to assist each other in fulfilling this responsibility, and declared their
preparedness to take timely and decisive action, through the Security Council and
in accordance with the UN Charter, when national authorities ‘manifestly fail’ to
protect their populations.16
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Vulnerability to contestation
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Winston, ‘Norm structure, diffusion, and evolution’, p. 639. As she notes, while norms entail that a state is
constrained to ‘do something appropriate’, the flexibility inherent in norms means that states can often determine for themselves what appropriate behaviour means in any context (p. 647).
Ralph Mamiya, ‘A history and conceptual development of the Protection of Civilians’, in Haidi Willmot,
Ralph Mamiya, Marc Weller and Scott Sheeran, eds, Protection of Civilians (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2016), p. 79.
Mamiya, ‘A history and conceptual development’, p. 79.
Mona Ali Khalil, ‘Legal aspects of the use of force by United Nations peacekeepers for the Protection of
Civilians’, in Willmot et al., eds, Protection of Civilians, pp. 205–23.
See Carsten Stahn, ‘Responsibility to Protect: political rhetoric or emerging legal norm’, American Journal of
International Law 101: 1, 2007, pp. 99–120; Maria Banda and Jennifer Welsh, ‘International law and the Respon-
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As Winston observes, the fact that norms—by their very nature—are both stable
and flexible often makes it difficult to reach agreement on their content and to
identify the particular behaviours that their underlying values demand.17 This
difficulty is particularly acute for R2P and PoC, which, as relatively recent and
‘emerging norms’, have experienced significant discursive and behavioural contestation. Three features, intrinsic to both norms, have made them particularly
vulnerable to contestation.
The first concerns issues of legality and the status of both norms. Whereas
many of the norms studied in International Relations have been enshrined in legal
form, PoC and R2P have a different relationship to international law. Both norms
have elements that comprise and build upon existing international law, along with
elements that some would argue go beyond the law’s stipulations. This gives rise
to contestation over their scope and the nature of the obligations associated with
them, including the degree to which they are considered ‘binding’.
In the case of PoC, the Security Council’s framing of the norm in peacekeeping has invoked a general, non-legalized concept of physical security aimed at
addressing a wide range of threats to civilians in conflict and post-conflict settings.
The absence of reference to international humanitarian law and international
human rights law in most PoC mandates broadens the norm’s scope to encompass incidents of physical violence that may not contravene international law.18
The lack of legally defined triggers for action also gives peacekeepers significant
discretion in interpreting what constitutes a threat.19 Furthermore, scholars and
practitioners remain divided over the question of whether protection mandates
entail an affirmative legal obligation on peacekeepers to act when civilians are
threatened or actually being attacked in their areas of deployment.20 Thus, while
it is generally accepted that Chapter VII mandates provide peacekeepers with legal
authorization to use force to protect civilians, in practice such mandates seem to
provide more of a discretionary right, allowing peacekeepers themselves to use
their judgement in deciding whether and how the use of force is appropriate.
In contrast to PoC, R2P was deliberately institutionalized at the 2005 world
summit as a political rather than a legal principle. As a result, the General Assembly
resolution endorsing R2P can be seen—at most—as an authoritative interpretation of established legal regimes related to both the prevention and the punishment of international crimes and the use of force.21 Proponents of R2P did not
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seek to create new law, but rather to enhance compliance with states’ existing
legal commitments. The new principle would do this, they hoped, by legitimizing
a shift in expectations about how the international community should view a
specific set of extreme situations in which any of four crimes are imminent or have
been committed. That R2P has a narrower scope of concern and greater precision
than PoC has not, however, eliminated the possibility of contestation. Instead, the
debate has shifted to the epistemic problems associated with arriving at a collective
view on a situation involving an atrocity crime and on whether the international
community’s responsibility has been triggered, as well as the difficulty of determining if and when military force should be considered.22
Second, a lack of specificity as to what is required for their implementation renders both norms particularly vulnerable to contestation. With PoC this
ambiguity results primarily from the fact that Security Council mandates are
outlined only briefly in resolutions, which provide general direction but little
operational guidance. PoC is framed directively as a norm requiring action from
peacekeepers when civilians are threatened. Nevertheless, how peacekeepers are
meant to intervene—what types of actions are required, including the extent to
which force can and should be used proactively or pre-emptively—has been underspecified, as have details on the procurement of resources necessary for protection.
Beginning in 2010, the DPKO developed conceptual and operational guidance on
PoC, moving beyond the ‘domain of physical protection from imminent threat’
and outlining three tiers of protection: (1) protection through political processes
(e.g. mediation, good offices); (2) protection from physical violence (e.g. through
deterrence or forceful response); and (3) establishment of a protective environment (e.g. through capacity-building and the rule of law).23 However, rather
than making the norm more precise and providing more guidance for action, as
discussed below, this three-tiered framework has arguably increased its ambiguity
as well as the possibilities for confusion and conflicting interpretations.
Like PoC, R2P is a directive norm that articulates a desired state of affairs—
protection for individuals threatened with atrocity crimes—but does not set out a
particular set of behaviours for states or other international actors. This ambiguity is compounded by two factors. The first is the norm’s three-pillar framework,
developed by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in his first report to the General
Assembly in order to give greater guidance on how R2P could be operationalized.24
The ‘complex norm’ of R2P thus not only contains more than one prescription—
for states and for the international community—but also creates a situation in
which the breach of one of the components of R2P (failure by a national government to protect its population) is meant to act as a trigger for fulfilment of another
component (the international community’s remedial role in protecting). This
sibility to Protect: clarifying or expanding states’ responsibilities?’, Global Responsibility to Protect 2: 3, 2010,
pp. 213–31.
See Jennifer Welsh, ‘The Responsibility to Protect after Libya and Syria’, Daedulus 145: 4, 2016, pp. 75–87.
Draft Operational Concept for the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (New York: UN
Department of Peacekeeping Operations / Department of Field Support Policy, 2010), p. 4.
Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, Report of the Secretary-General, A/63/677 (New York: UN, 12 Jan.
2009).

602
International Affairs 95: 3, 2019

INTA95_3_FullIssue.indb 602

16/04/2019 15:18

Close cousins in protection: the evolution of two norms

25

26
27
28
29

30

‘Applicatory contestation’ refers to contestation over ‘(1) [whether a norm is] appropriate for a given situation
and (2) which actions it requires’: Nicole Deitelhoff and Lisbeth Zimmermann, Things we lost in the fire: how
different types of contestation affect the validity of international norms, PRIF working papers no. 18 (Frankfurt am
Main: Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, 2013), p. 5.
Welsh, ‘Norm contestation’.
Paddon Rhoads, Taking sides in peacekeeping.
United Nations peacekeeping operations: principles and guidelines (New York: DPKO, 2008), p. 33.
United Nations peacekeeping operations: principles and guidelines, pp. 19, 67; The protection of civilians in United Nations
peacekeeping (New York: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations / Department of Field Support Policy,
1 April 2015), p. 7.
See e.g. Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2016 substantive session, A/70/19 (New York:
UN, 15 March 2016), p. 11.
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formulation makes the norm susceptible to what scholars have called ‘applicatory
contestation’,25 given that states can debate whether greater emphasis should be
placed on one pillar rather than another, and when the international community’s
remedial role has been activated. The second factor contributing to ambiguity is
the tendency for actors to invoke the morally charged concept of responsibility
primarily as a means to summon up political will, rather than to establish a concrete
plan of action. Pillar three does not prescribe a specific collective action to be taken
by the international community, but rather establishes a more general ‘duty of
conduct’ on the part of its members to identify when atrocity crimes are being
committed or are imminent,26 and to deliberate—on a ‘case-by-case’ basis—on
how various actors (national, regional and international) can and should respond.
The third element of both norms that has increased their vulnerability to
contestation is their ambiguous relationship to other, more mature norms. As a
relatively recent priority for peacekeepers, PoC interacts in controversial ways
with established principles of peacekeeping: impartiality, host-state consent, and
non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate. The institutionalization of PoC has resulted in a reinterpretation of this trinity.27 Impartiality, no longer construed as passive, now prescribes that ‘UN forces should
implement their mandates without favour or prejudice to any party’,28 while
consent is divided into two levels: strategic and tactical.29 While the former is still
a requirement for any peacekeeping mission, the latter is no longer deemed necessary: forceful action should be taken against those who imperil civilians.
Notwithstanding this refinement by the Secretariat, tensions remain. There is
confusion over what actions are permissible to implement the protection imperative and whether force can be used against one party without the mission being
regarded as partial. Additionally, although missions authorized under Chapter
VII have procedures for enforcement action and are legally allowed to use force
without host-state consent, the belief is still widespread among member states and
within the Secretariat that consent remains a political if not a legal requirement.30
This tension has arisen in contexts such as Darfur, the Democratic Republic
of Congo (DRC) and South Sudan, where government forces have been major
perpetrators of violence against civilians.
As a political norm, R2P has been positioned as a reinforcer of established
legal obligations related to atrocity crimes. Some scholars have therefore begun to
refer to a broader ‘normative complex’ for protection that encompasses genocide
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prevention, particular principles of international humanitarian law, accountability
for international crimes, and PoC in armed conflict.31 Yet R2P’s origins lie in a
perceived tension between two sets of norms: those related to the promotion and
protection of human rights, and those related to non-intervention and the non-use
of force. By rooting R2P’s coercive aspects firmly within the collective security
provisions of the UN Charter, and effectively ruling out the legitimacy of unilateral humanitarian intervention, the 2005 summit outcome document arguably
resolved that tension: any use of force to implement R2P is to be authorized by
the Security Council and thus should not be deemed unlawful interference in
a state’s domestic jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the annual dialogues in the General
Assembly reveal a belief on the part of some states that R2P creates a more permissive approach to intervention by legitimizing a wider range of protective action.32
Contestation of R2P and PoC has been shaped not only by these intrinsic features
of both norms, but also by two additional factors: the institutional ‘homes’—or
venues—in which the norms have been embedded, as well as the degree to which
actors have implementation access.33 PoC was owned first and foremost by the
Security Council—the body that issues protection mandates. Implementation
access was therefore limited to permanent and non-permanent members of the
Council as well as, to a lesser extent, countries contributing troops to peacekeeping missions. As shown below, PoC also gradually came to be discussed within the
C34—the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations that was established by
and reports to the General Assembly. In this venue, a broader range of states has,
on the basis of deliberation and consensus, fleshed out how peacekeeping operations actually function. But the creation of twin homes for PoC—the Security
Council and C34—has opened up a gap between the venue where the norm is
formally authorized and that where its implementation is most actively discussed
and planned, thereby increasing the likelihood of behavioural contestation and
underscoring the importance of venue and access in accounting for norm dynamics.
R2P took the opposite path. It was initially owned by the General Assembly,
offering equal and ‘open access’—at least theoretically—for all member states.
Key countries such as Russia and China consciously precluded discussion of the
principle within the Security Council chamber and sceptical developing countries
guarded their role in furthering ‘conceptual development’ within the Assembly.34
The General Assembly has continued to be the paramount venue for discussion
of R2P, through the annual informal dialogues and, as of 2018, through formal
agenda debate. With increased frequency since 2011, however, the Security Council
has passed a series of resolutions referring to R2P—both in specific cases and in
relation to thematic issues.35 This has opened up the possibility for preferential
implementation access to those countries sitting within the Council chamber. On
Rotmann et al., ‘Major powers and the contested evolution of a Responsibility to Protect’.
See summaries of the General Assembly interactive dialogues, 2013–17, and the formal debate of the Assembly
on 25 June 2018, http://www.globalr2p.org/resources/897. (Unless otherwise noted at point of citation, all
URLs cited in this article were accessible on 12 March 2019.)
On ‘implementation access’, see n. 3 above.
Welsh, ‘Norm contestation’.
See Global Centre for R2P, http://www.globalr2p.org/resources/335.
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Mapping contestation
This section analyses discursive and behavioural contestation of R2P and PoC in
three phases, beginning with the late 1990s and concluding with recent events in
Burundi, Syria and Myanmar (Burma). We draw on a variety of primary sources,
including reports of the UN Secretary-General on R2P and the protection of
civilians in armed conflict, Security Council resolutions and statements that make
reference to R2P and PoC, summaries of the annual informal interactive dialogue
on R2P in the General Assembly and the annual C34 meeting on peacekeeping, as
well as individual member state statements and policy actions. In order to supplement these formal documents, and gain insight into the perspective of institutional actors on the interplay between the two norms, we also draw on targeted
semi-structured interviews.
The mapping of contestation undertaken here demonstrates that while PoC
and R2P developed in different venues and with distinct policy frameworks, they
have evolved in parallel. Indeed, in response to contestation, actors have at times
explicitly sought to contrast or link the two norms. This section also shows, in
line with Stimmer and Wisken’s framework, that norm ambiguity, differentiated
implementation access and lack of institutional responsibility can increase the
likelihood of behavioural contestation.
Phase I (1999–2005)
PoC experienced little overt discursive contestation in its early years, having not
yet appeared on the agenda of the C34 and thus lacking substantive discussion
by a range of states. The Security Council’s pursuit of PoC as a broad thematic
issue focused on three initiatives during this period: a ‘roadmap’ outlining the
protection responsibilities of various UN bodies; better coordination between the
36
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the other hand, the implementation framework set out in 2009 consciously seeks
to move R2P beyond ‘New York’, not only to other intergovernmental bodies
such as the human rights mechanisms in Geneva, but also to regional organizations, individual member states and civil society. This move theoretically provides
implementation access to a host of actors, though—according to two leading
observers of R2P—‘to date, embrace of the norm outside of the UN has still
been relatively “shallow”’.36
In relation to PoC and R2P alike, the UN Secretariat has remained a critical
actor in trying to bridge both the gap between authorization and actual practice,
and the differing views among member states about the two norms’ prescriptions.
As a result, largely in response to discursive contestation, Secretariat officials have
actively sought to find a consensus on how PoC and R2P should be conceived and
operationalized.

Alex J. Bellamy and Edward C. Luck, The Responsibility to Protect: from promise to practice (Cambridge: Polity,
2018), p. 189.
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Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and DPKO; and
drafting the first aide-memoire on protection.37 Moreover, while peacekeepers in
the DRC, Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire were authorized with protection mandates,
the actual practice of PoC during these years was erratic. Evidence of behavioural contestation was therefore also slim, and tended to become manifest more
indirectly through lack of resources to support robust protection.
Somewhat surprisingly, it was within the Office of the Secretary-General and
the DPKO, and among certain states, that PoC was hotly contested. While states
advocating PoC in the Security Council were keen to push implementation of the
norm forward with robust peacekeeping mandates, Kofi Annan was concerned
about the UN getting ahead of its broader membership, and thus failing to garner
the necessary backing to deliver ‘real’ protection. ‘Stern words’ were reportedly
exchanged between Annan and Canadian diplomat Robert Fowler during the
drafting of Resolution 1270 on Sierra Leone.38 The message from the SecretaryGeneral’s office was, as Fowler put it: ‘Don’t design to fail. Just because you have a
nice idea, just because it is informed by goodness doesn’t mean it will work. If you
set up a mandate like this and we fail, it will be catastrophic for the institution.’39
In other words, Annan’s concern that the UN might overpromise and underdeliver, and thus damage its legitimacy, put brakes on his normative ambition.
His ‘principled activism’ was balanced by ‘the hard-learnt recognition that the
Council’s stated ambitions do not always translate into tangible commitments in
practice’.40
A related worry among Annan and Secretariat officials was that PoC would be
used as token evidence that the Security Council was ‘doing something’ about a
crisis.41 It would effectively become ‘R2P-lite’, thereby weakening Annan’s other
normative agenda. The crafting of robust PoC mandates would serve as a substitute for—a form of behavioural contestation of—not only the Security Council’s
political engagement, but also more forceful military action. By the mid-2000s,
the belief that robust peacekeeping mandates were diverting attention from the
requirements of R2P became more widespread in the Secretariat. The reigning
assumption was that because peacekeeping still requires, at least in theory, a degree
of state consent, it limits the possible coercive use of force and thus avoids R2P’s
frequent association with humanitarian intervention.
In these early years, it was precisely the continued controversy over humanitarian intervention that dominated the debate over R2P, which took place in a
variety of settings outside the intergovernmental frameworks of the UN. Despite
the ICISS report’s seemingly elegant solution to the twin problems of Rwanda and
Kosovo, it quickly became clear that the concept of a ‘responsibility to protect’
could not avoid normative and legal controversy, or neo-colonial connotations.42
UN Security Council, Protection of Civilians, cross-cutting report no. 2 (New York, 2008).
Quoted in Paddon Rhoads, Taking sides in peacekeeping, p. 106.
Paddon Rhoads, Taking sides in peacekeeping, p. 106.
Paddon Rhoads, Taking sides in peacekeeping, p. 95.
The causes of conflict, p. 77.
Jennifer Welsh, ‘The “Responsibility to Protect”: securing the individual in international society?’, in Benjamin Goold and Liora Lazarus, eds, Security and human rights (Oxford: Hart, 2007).
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The subsequent war in Iraq was a huge setback for efforts to build normative
consensus in favour of R2P and to pursue formal codification, given the fears
it seemed to confirm about states bypassing the UN system in using force and
twisting humanitarian arguments to buttress more narrow national interests.43
Unexpectedly, it was the fallout from Iraq that enabled R2P to re-emerge on
the diplomatic agenda.44 The key moment came when the principle was picked up
by the high-level panel of experts chosen by Annan in September 2003 to address
the growing tensions in the UN’s collective security system.45 Thus, somewhat
paradoxically, while the Secretary-General seemed to be putting the brakes on
PoC within the Secretariat, he was simultaneously lobbying extensively for R2P
to be brought into the UN system. The high-level panel challenged the view that
there were no longer any rules governing military intervention, and endorsed the
claims of ICISS that ‘proper purpose’ in respect of the use of force now encompassed actions designed to save civilians from atrocity crimes. Both positions were
echoed by Annan in his March 2005 report to the General Assembly, which laid
the groundwork for the intergovernmental negotiations that led to the summit
outcome document.46
At this point, all member states had the opportunity to discursively contest both
the appropriateness and the meaning of R2P. In practice, as with many multilateral
negotiations, coalitions of states staked out positions around contentious issues, and
those with greater expertise and influence exercised disproportionate impact on the
final outcome. For example, the effort to establish Security Council criteria for the
use of force was contested by the permanent members of the Council, in particular
the United States, which were worried that a checklist ‘set in stone’ would diminish
the flexibility they had hitherto enjoyed to interpret and respond to the international security landscape.47 Many developing countries (most vocally represented
by China, India and Iran) expressed unease about the potential expansion of the
legitimate exceptions to article 2(4) of the UN Charter and thus the possibility of
further military action by the strong against the weak. They also called for the
international community to focus greater attention on building capacity in weak
states before the development of intervention-generating crises.
As a result of this contestation, the language articulating the responsibilities of
the international community in the summit outcome document was weaker than
that which appeared in the ICISS report. An odd coalition of states—including
the United States and many developing countries in the General Assembly—
called for this less expansive language. Nonetheless, in opposition to the discursive
contestation of states such as Egypt, Iran, Pakistan and Syria, article 139 of the
summit outcome document explicitly mentions Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
For those states advocating R2P, most notably Canada and EU member states,
Gareth Evans, ‘When is it right to fight?’, Survival 46: 3, 2004, pp. 59–81; David Clark, ‘Iraq has wrecked our
case for humanitarian wars’, Guardian, 21 Aug. 2003.
This point is emphasized by Marc Pollentine. See the discussion in Welsh, ‘Norm contestation’.
See A more secure world.
In larger freedom.
Letter from Ambassador John Bolton to UN, 30 Aug. 2005, available at http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.
org/files/US_Boltonletter_R2P_30Aug05[1].pdf.
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Phase II (2006–2010)
At this point R2P and PoC figured in different institutional forums within the
UN, with the General Assembly taking the lead on the former. The Security
Council was comparatively silent on R2P, becoming bogged down in lengthy
negotiations over two resolutions in 2006,50 and passing only one resolution on
the subject between 2007 and 2010.51 This reticence on R2P contrasted with the
Council’s more active and sharper engagement with PoC in this phase, prompted
in part by negative news coverage of crises in the DRC, Somalia and Sudan.52
Resolution 1674 (2006) introduced new language aimed at ensuring implementation of PoC mandates by peacekeeping missions.53 In 2008, under Resolution
1856, the UN mission in the DRC became the first to operate with a mandate that
designated PoC as the highest priority, and to consider physical threats of violence
to civilians ‘from any of the parties engaged in the conflict’.54 The following year,
in a thematic resolution on PoC (Resolution 1894), the Council stressed that for
all peacekeeping missions, mandated protection activities had to ‘be given priority
in resource allocation’.55
To bridge these disparate normative discourses and build support for R2P,
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, unlike his predecessor, actively promoted the
linkages between the two norms—a move that caused considerable discomfort
within parts of the Secretariat. In his first Report on the protection of civilians in armed
conflict (2007), the Secretary-General suggested that R2P as manifest in the summit
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
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the principle would have lacked teeth without this link to enforcement by the
Security Council.48
A final noteworthy feature of the summit outcome document, which laid
the groundwork for later episodes of behavioural contestation, is the fact that
the international community’s responsibility to protect, set out in article 139,
is preceded by article 138’s emphasis on the ‘primary responsibility’ of national
authorities. While this formulation reflected the normative consensus, it also gave
states the opportunity to argue about proper sequencing and, ultimately, to block
or sabotage international action to protect. Those states that in 2004 opposed the
application of sanctions against the Sudanese government in relation to its conduct
in Darfur reiterated that it is sovereign states who remain the ‘first responders’ in
terms of protection, and that the crisis had not reached the point where it could
be definitively concluded that Sudan had failed to live up to its responsibilities.49

Welsh, ‘The Responsibility to Protect’.
Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the crisis in Darfur’, Security Dialogue
36: 1, 2005, pp. 27–47.
Resolution 1706, discussed below, and Resolution 1674 (2006) reaffirmed articles 138 and 139 of the summit
outcome document.
S/RES/1894, 11 Nov. 2009.
See UN Security Council, Protection of Civilians.
S/RES/1674, 28 April 2006.
S/RES/1856, 22 Dec. 2008, emphasis added.
S/RES/ 1894, 11 Nov. 2009.
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Report on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, S/2007/643 (New York: UN, 2007); Thomas G. Weiss and Tatiana Carayannis, ‘Windows of opportunity for UN reform: historical insights for the next Secretary-General’,
International Affairs 93: 2, March 2017, pp. 309–28.
Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, Report of the Secretary-General, A/63/677 (New York: UN, 12 Jan.
2009), para. 68.
Author’s telephone interview with UN official, July 2018.
See remarks by member states in the first informal dialogue on the R2P in July 2009, available at http://www.
globalr2p.org/resources/897.
Fifth Committee takes up financing for special political missions, procurement, GA/AB/3832 (New York: UN, 17 Dec.
2007). See also Stimmer and Wisken, ‘The dynamics of dissent’.
We consider that Security Council resolutions represent one of the strongest forms of action by the Council—
given that it is an authorizing rather than an operational body—and thus can be considered as evidence for/
against behavioural contestation. When states negotiate for a particular framing of a situation, or for specific
language in a mandate, they are directly shaping what operational actors can and cannot do in practice.
See the discussion in Jess Gifkins, ‘R2P in the UN Security Council: Darfur, Libya and beyond’, Cooperation
and Conflict 51: 2, 2016, pp. 156–7.
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outcome document had advanced the normative framework of PoC.56 Two years
later, he articulated an explicit connection between R2P and PoC, and called for
the ‘mainstreaming’ of R2P through UN peacekeeping operations.57
In an instance of discursive contestation, the DPKO responded with a ‘deliberate effort’ to disentangle the two norms and differentiate PoC from R2P.58 PoC
was to maintain its place of prominence in UN peacekeeping, whereas R2P was
expunged from official peacekeeping discourse because of the perceived political
sensitivities surrounding it. The DPKO’s position reflected broader concerns,
voiced by some states, that contestation over R2P—and specifically the norm’s link
to coercive military means—risked contaminating PoC. While many countries
praised the emerging R2P norm, a vocal group of states, notably Cuba, Egypt
and Pakistan, expressed unease about the implications of the summit outcome
document in the first General Assembly debate on the subject and in subsequent
informal interactive dialogues.59 Resistance to the norm was also expressed by
sceptical states through forms of behavioural contestation, including opposition to funding for the Office of Special Adviser during the bi-annual budget
debate of the Fifth Committee of the Assembly. Representatives from China,
Cuba and Pakistan insisted that the office’s budget should be determined by the
entire General Assembly—a procedural intervention that stalled funding for three
years.60
The ongoing crisis in Darfur constituted another early site for behavioural
contestation over R2P. Although Security Council Resolution 1706 (2006) and
subsequent action represented a victory of sorts for advocates such as France
and the United Kingdom, which were trying to build momentum around the
emerging norm, the fact that the Council took more than six months to negotiate
its response illustrates the degree of unease felt by some member states.61 The
final text of the resolution, which authorized the transition from a regional to a
UN mission, raised difficult issues regarding the importance of host-state consent.
China and Russia, along with Qatar, ultimately abstained from voting on Resolution 1706, and China (along with Sudan) actively prevented the invocation of R2P
in a subsequent resolution on Darfur (Resolution 1769) just a year later.62 Given
that repetition of language in UN resolutions can be interpreted as reaffirmation
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Paddon Rhoads, Taking sides in peacekeeping.
Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, p.17; Uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and
people, Report of the UN High-level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations (New York: UN, June 2015).
Human Rights Watch, Killings in Kiwanja: the UN’s inability to protect civilians (New York, 2008).
OCHA and DPKO, Protecting civilians in the context of UN peacekeeping operations (New York, 2009).
Implementing the Responsibility to Protect.
Cristina G. Badescu and Thomas G. Weiss, ‘Misrepresenting R2P and advancing norms: an alternative spiral?’,
International Studies Perspectives, vol. 11, 2010, pp. 354–74.
Jennifer M. Welsh, ‘The “narrow but deep approach” to implementing the Responsibility to Protect: reassessing the focus on international crimes’, in Sheri P. Rosenberg, Tibi Galis and Alex Zucker, eds, Reconstructing
atrocity prevention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
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of principles and practices, the active blocking of R2P language by some Council
members can be understood as a form of behavioural contestation.
In addition to forms of discursive and behavioural contestation over R2P,
growing dissent over PoC exacerbated the DPKO’s concerns about conflating the
two norms. During consultations in 2005–2007 to develop the first ever comprehensive peacekeeping doctrine, many states associated with the Non-Aligned
Movement voiced objections to the Council’s emphasis on the use of force to
protect civilians from physical threat.63 Consequently, when PoC first featured
on the C34’s agenda in 2008, it was criticized by a number of states—including
several of the largest troop-contributing countries (TCCs)—which claimed that
PoC mandates were eroding the norms of sovereignty and self-determination.64
Many of these same states pointed to inherent inequalities in decision-making
and peacekeeping policy, namely inadequate consultation with TCCs and lack of
burden-sharing.65
Implementation of PoC was also compromised by behavioural contestation
at the field level. In places like Kiwanja (DRC), peacekeepers with knowledge
of imminent threats to civilians failed to take preventive action.66 The reasons
for this inaction included insufficient capabilities, the perceived risks associated
with acting, and confusion over conflicting interpretations of mandates. A 2009
OCHA–DPKO study highlighted the dearth of operational guidance on PoC and
concluded that UN staff continued to hold widely varying interpretations of the
mandate, often within the same mission context.67
These various forms of discursive and behavioural contestation were instrumental in motivating efforts to clarify the meaning and scope of both norms. Ban
Ki-moon’s three-pillar conceptualization of R2P became the accepted consensus
on the norm’s meaning in diplomatic circles.68 Furthermore, controversial attempts
by states to misapply R2P to the cases of Iraq, Cyclone Nargis and South Ossetia,
combined with its successful application in the wake of electoral violence in Kenya
in 2007–2008, helped to define the norm’s scope.69 The ‘narrow but deep approach’
to R2P implementation,70 advocated by the Secretary-General and his first Special
Adviser, clarified both the limited range of situations to which the norm would
apply and the broad suite of tools that implementation would require.
Similarly, in response to contestation over PoC, DPKO officials developed the
three-tiered conceptualization of the norm that expanded its scope to encompass
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prescriptions that do not require use of force and emphasize support to the state.71
This was partly an attempt to make PoC more palatable to its critics, as one DPKO
official observed: ‘That was part of the messaging, definitely part of our theory of
change ... It was in large part about assuring sceptical Member States that peacekeeping is mostly not about the use of force.’72 The Security Council’s authorization of increasingly robust mandates in the next phase, however, seemed to suggest
otherwise.

The spring of 2011 was a turning point for both norms. In March, the Security
Council passed Resolution 1973, which authorized member states ‘to take all necessary measures ... to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of
attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi’. The resolution was
unprecedented in its authorization to protect civilians without the consent of the
host state. And yet, while the military action in Libya is described as a ‘textbook
case’ of R2P implementation,73 and the norm is widely viewed as having been
an important motivating factor for some western actors in the intervention,74
the phrase ‘responsibility to protect’ did not appear in the mandate. Instead, PoC
language was used in what was essentially an R2P intervention. The following
month a diplomatic furore erupted over the actions of UN peacekeepers in
the aftermath of a contested presidential election in Côte d’Ivoire. UN-authorized forces used helicopter gunships against the presidential palace of Laurent
Gbagbo—in the name of protecting civilians—while Alassane Ouattara, Gbagbo’s
opponent, was protected by peacekeepers at his base.
The fallout was immense. In both cases, critics charged that PoC had morphed
into regime change and that humanitarian arguments were being abused to further
western interests. In an instance of discursive contestation, the Brazilian government launched ‘Responsibility while Protecting’—an initiative aimed at reinterpreting R2P by emphasizing the international community’s non-military options,
limiting recourse to force as a ‘last resort’, and strengthening the accountability of
those who act militarily under a Council mandate. These themes, which garnered
a significant degree of support among member states, became sticking points in
the (unsuccessful) efforts to pass a new General Assembly resolution on R2P in
2015—ten years after the summit outcome document.75 The discursive contestation that surrounded negotiations over the draft text illustrates the formation of
a new kind of political coalition that included pro-R2P states that perceived an
71
72
73
74
75
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Phase III (2011–2018)

Draft Operational Concept for the Protection of Civilians.
Author’s telephone interview with UN official, July 2018.
Interview with Gareth Evans by Alan Philps for The World Today 68: 6, Oct./Nov. 2012, pp. 30–32, http://
www.globalr2p.org/media/files/gareth-evans-on-responsibility-to-protect-after-libya.pdf.
Rebecca Adler-Nissen and Vincent Pouliot, ‘Power in practice: negotiating the international intervention in
Libya’, European Journal of International Relations 20: 4, 2014, pp. 889–911.
Aarie Glas, ‘African Union security culture in practice: African problems and African solutions’, International
Affairs 94: 5, Sept. 2018, pp. 1121–38.
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Implementing the responsibility to protect, A/63/677; Mobilizing collective action: the next decade of the Responsibility to
Protect, Report of the Secretary-General, A/70/999 (New York: UN, 2016).
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illegitimate stretching of the NATO mandate in Libya and developing countries
that had always worried about the prospect of regime change imposed from the
outside.76 This coalition was opposed by France, the United Kingdom and the
United States, all of which were and remain resistant to any mechanisms that
would curtail the Security Council’s freedom of manoeuvre or submit its actions
to forms of oversight.77
The backlash from the events of 2011 is also evident in the emphasis that some
states place on the state-centric elements of R2P and PoC, in contrast to the more
individualist or ‘people-centred’ vision of the ICISS report. A set of developing
countries, including China, has drawn on the specific text of the summit outcome
document not only to emphasize the pre-eminent role of national authorities
in the implementation of R2P, but also to call for international assistance that
strengthens state capacity, reinforces sovereignty and respects different national
‘paths’ to implementing R2P.78 Some states have also pursued this statist interpretation of R2P by attempting to inject a notion of hierarchy into the norm’s
prescriptions, challenging the Secretary-General’s claim that the pillars are of
equal weight, mutually reinforcing and non-sequential.79 Assembly discussions
of R2P, particularly between 2014 and 2018, feature statements insisting that R2P
is first and foremost a national responsibility, and that the role of the international
community is always secondary.80
In a similar fashion, several states, including a number of TCCs, have increasingly framed their support for PoC in the C34 with reference to those activities
that fall under tiers 1 and 3 of the DPKO’s expanded framework. They maintain
that PoC is the primary responsibility of the state, affirm the continued importance of consent, and stress that the UN should pursue protection through
unarmed strategies and support for the state and political processes.81 These same
states have resisted the Kigali Principles on the Protection of Civilians,82 opposed
initiatives that seek to strengthen accountability mechanisms for implementation
of PoC mandates,83 and pushed forward the ‘force protection’ agenda to highlight
the risks faced by peacekeepers themselves.84 Although these interpretations do
not amount to a frontal assault on either R2P or PoC, they arguably represent
a conscious attempt to reshape the meaning of both norms through a form of
‘constructive’ discursive contestation.
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What is more, phase III has been marked by various forms of behavioural
contestation. While advances have been made at the national level to assist with
implementation of R2P’s first pillar, including the National Focal Point initiative,85
there has been a decline in the use of specific R2P language in deliberations within
the Security Council regarding several critical cases where atrocity crimes have
been committed or are imminent. During the crisis of 2015–2016 in Burundi,
which resulted in widespread human rights violations and systematic killing,
some Security Council members (including Russia) insisted that the situation
was ‘political’ and that R2P was irrelevant.86 They pursued behavioural contestation by opposing any consideration of deploying a UN force under Chapter VII
and blocked the inclusion of R2P language in the resolution that was eventually
tabled.87 In the case of Syria, political deadlock within the Security Council over
the legitimacy of international efforts to address the violence meant that states
initially responded by pursuing independent rather than collective action—for
example, through sanctions by the Arab League, EU and United States. The first
Security Council resolution on the situation in Syria, passed in 2014, was limited
to a demand that parties to the conflict allow delivery of humanitarian assistance.88 While that resolution—along with subsequent Council decisions89—did
invoke pillar one by reminding government authorities of their responsibility to
protect the Syrian population, it did not articulate any international responsibilities
associated with R2P. More recently, the Security Council was notably reticent
on the situation in Myanmar, limiting its formal response—despite warnings by
senior UN officials that attacks by state security forces against the Rohingya might
constitute genocide—to the adoption of a presidential statement stressing the
‘primary responsibility of the Myanmar government to protect its population’.90
Given that a key normative prescription for the international community in R2P
is a ‘duty of conduct’, the absence of deliberation and response across these cases
is significant evidence of behavioural contestation.
Behavioural contestation with respect to PoC has also increased in this most
recent phase. Although missions intensified their involvement in a wide range of
protection activities that fall under tiers 1 and 3, and demonstrated ingenuity in
developing various protection tools,91 peacekeepers seldom used force to protect
civilians in imminent danger.92 In its review of eight missions, the UN Office
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of Internal Oversight Services uncovered a ‘persistent pattern’ of peacekeeper
passivity in which ‘force was almost never used’ to protect civilians.93 Similarly,
the 2015 High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) lamented
that the vast increases in resources, research and policy guidelines on PoC have ‘yet
to transform reality on the ground, where it matters’.94
Failure to implement the more forceful provisions of PoC mandates is in a
sense hardly surprising, reflecting as it does what the HIPPO panel found to be
a ‘lack of consensus’ among member states over PoC.95 Different and conflicting
views persist about what constitutes ‘imminent threat of physical violence’,
whether and when force can be used against elements of the host government,
and how TCCs should assume the risks associated with the use of force. These
concerns and different interpretations are manifest in what UN officials describe
as the increasing prevalence of national caveats, creating a de facto dual line of
command. In several mission contexts, the advice offered from TCC capitals has
conflicted with directives issued by senior mission officials. While TCCs lack the
necessary power and access to realize their preferred conception of the norm at
headquarters, caveats—as a form of behavioural contestation—attest to the fact
that, as those primarily putting application of the norm into practice, TCCs have
a certain degree of implementation access and autonomy at the field level.
The shift towards a more state-centric conceptualization of PoC and R2P, and
increased behavioural contestation that dilutes the imperative for collective action
to protect, are worrying signs of a less hospitable political environment for the
advancement of these norms. The dynamics of dissent captured in this third phase
thus point to the resilience of other powerful ‘pluralist’ norms—such as sovereign
equality, national ownership, non-interference and consent—that are enjoying
renewed consensus in an era of resurgent nationalism.96 Nevertheless, it is too
soon to proclaim the demise of these two protection norms, or of the normative
impulse that contributed to their creation and continues to motivate a set of state
and non-state actors. The 2015 HIPPO report’s call for a more ‘people-centred’
approach to peacekeeping, and the prioritization of ‘people’ in Secretary-General
Guterres’s 2018 ‘Action for Peacekeeping’ initiative, can be viewed as the Secretariat’s latest attempts to foster consensus on the continued need to protect individuals
and to close the gap between stated ambition and actual practice. Similarly, the
successful move to place R2P on the formal agenda of the General Assembly in
2017 and 2018, as opposed to maintaining an informal dialogue, illustrates that
there remains a broad and cross-regional grouping of states still committed to its
implementation within and beyond the UN.
Finally, it is worth noting some recent concrete efforts to bring the two norms
closer together at the field level. One example is a training programme, led by the
or AMISOM in Somalia), regional interests have played a significant role. See Paddon Rhoads, Taking sides
in peacekeeping.
Evaluation of the implementation and results of protection of civilians mandate, p. 1.
Uniting our strengths for peace, para. 82.
Uniting our strengths for peace, para. 82.
Andrew Hurrell, ‘Power transitions, global justice and the virtues of pluralism’, Ethics and International Affairs
27: 2, 2013, pp. 189–205.
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Assessing the dynamics of dissent on protection
Our comparative examination of the nature, evolution and contestation of R2P
and PoC underscores the value of considering how norms work together, or are
consciously used in juxtaposition. It stands to reason that, as social facts, norms
rarely operate in isolation. The stories of the two protection norms have been
intertwined—in some cases through the involvement of the same individual norm
entrepreneurs, or sceptical member states, but also because contestation has been
manifest in the choice to invoke one norm rather than the other.
As we have shown, UN staff have at times consciously sought to separate R2P
from the PoC concerns of peacekeepers, predominantly out of fear that equating
the two norms would foster resistance to the advancement of PoC. Individual
states have also engaged in the strategy of dissociation. Australia and Uruguay, for
example, clearly distinguished PoC from R2P when organizing the workshops
that served as precursors to the introduction of PoC into the C34;98 and some
member states have deliberately used the language of PoC rather than R2P in their
contributing statements to General Assembly informal dialogues. Even Canada,
one of the early promoters of R2P, deliberately avoided invoking the norm in
justifying its involvement in the Libya bombing in 2011, preferring instead to
proclaim its ‘resolve to protect civilians’.99 Since 2011, even with the more statist
elements of R2P in the ascendant, some diplomats describe R2P ‘talk’ in the
context of peacekeeping as ‘toxic’, and to be avoided ‘at all cost’.100
Our analysis of the dynamics of contestation also reveals the importance of
considering which actors contest norms, and where they do so. We have suggested
that, despite the origins—and prominence—of R2P and PoC in the UN, individuals within the Secretariat have discursively contested both norms at different
points, mainly out of a concern for institutional legitimacy. In the case of R2P, the
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Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, aimed at enhancing the capacity
of peacekeepers to identify and respond to the warning signs of atrocity crimes.97
For advocates of R2P, this initiative reflects the pragmatic recognition that peace
operations and stabilization missions, which—unlike the 2011 Libya mission—
operate with the consent of the host state, are likely to be the major multilateral
context in which military means are used to protect populations. For those in
the peacekeeping community, the project is an acknowledgement that existing
training on PoC requires more sophisticated and dynamic threat assessments, and
that clearer operational guidance on protection for TCCs is required prior to
deployment.
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Information about the programme, sponsored by the government of Canada, can be found at http://www.
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General Assembly, open as it is to the participation of all UN members, has from
the outset been the primary site for discursive contestation among states. Attempts
to discuss R2P within the Security Council have enabled states sceptical about the
norm, such as Russia, to engage in behavioural contestation through its voting and,
given the limited membership of this body, to wield disproportionate influence on
decision-making. With respect to PoC, behavioural contestation at the field level
in phases II and III has been shaped by TCCs’ lack of access, at headquarters and
within the Council, to realize their preferred understanding of the norm.
Finally, our study illuminates several elements of Stimmer and Wisken’s framework for understanding norm contestation and highlights areas of potential theoretical refinement. First, the analysis supports the assertion that implementation
access, particularly when accompanied by weak access to deliberative and decision-making bodies, increases the likelihood that an actor will pursue behavioural
contestation. Second, we have shown how the ambiguity surrounding the obligations that underpin both norms, as well as the lack of clear authority or responsibility for their implementation, may increase an actor’s proclivity for behavioural
contestation. With respect to PoC, this has resulted in increasingly robust peacekeeping mandates, yet little change in PoC practice at the field level. Turning to
R2P, we see behavioural contestation in the failure of states to fulfil their ‘duty of
conduct’, exemplified by a lack of deliberation on situations where atrocities have
occurred or are imminent. Third, we have demonstrated how other ambiguities
surrounding both norms contribute to contestation, by enabling actors to debate
which norm applies in a given situation, or to draw on one or more pillars or tiers
to emphasize their preferred interpretation of what action the norms prescribe.
The latter aspect of norm ambiguity, which draws on the inherent flexibility of
norms, has also had an ‘upside’: it has proved crucial in keeping both norms alive.
In the words of one western diplomat: ‘The three-tier conceptualization of PoC
has allowed the norm to continue to exist. We would not be having a conversation
about PoC, if it was solely about physical protection.’101 The same could be said
about R2P’s three-pillar framework. The consensus that protection from atrocity
crimes involves national, regional and international efforts, and that prevention is
at the core of R2P, has widened implementation access to a variety of institutions
and organizations, and has diluted the impact of contestation over the use of military means. As a consequence, despite strategies that seek to set them apart, the
two norms of R2P and PoC, these ‘close cousins’, today have similar structures,
strengths and vulnerabilities. They are also both experiencing a disjuncture between
macro-level institutionalization and inconsistent or inadequate implementation.
Conclusions
The development of the two norms of R2P and PoC, and their interrelationship, continue to be shaped by failure: failure to consider situations as requiring
concerted international action; failure to respond in a timely and decisive fashion
101
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to protection crises; and failure to fully implement what mandates prescribe.102 As
we have suggested, while some of these failures represent deficiencies in capacity
and political will, some have also been shaped by behavioural contestation of the
two norms, as states ‘act out’ their dissent by blocking or hampering efforts to
protect populations.
On the PoC side, some might argue that this failure can actually be productive, given the norm’s more operational focus. The UN’s willingness to be transparent and frank about what has gone wrong in past peace operations also presents
opportunities for the organization to bring member states together in efforts to
improve doctrine and practice.103 With respect to R2P, the impact of failure works
in different and more complex ways. At the micro level, efforts to build state
capacity to protect and to address risk factors leading to atrocity crimes are a
powerful, if less visible, testament to the commitment to learn from past failures.
But at the macro level, inaction in the face of war crimes, genocide and crimes
against humanity—a quarter of a century after their perpetration in Rwanda and
Srebrenica—raises doubts among some about the utility of a political principle,
despite its unanimous endorsement in 2005, particularly in an international
environment where unity among the major powers continues to prove so elusive.
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